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COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PROFESSOR'S ASSIGNMENT OF GRADES TO
STUDENTS IS SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
During the 1982-83 academic year, Natthu Parate, a nonten-
ured associate professor in the Tennessee State University Civil
Engineering Department, was ordered by Edward Isibor, the
Dean of the College, to change a student's grade from a "B" to an
"A."1 When Parate refused to comply with the Dean's request,
the Dean insulted Parate and advised him that his employment
contract might not be renewed.2 Fearing reprisals, Parate com-
plied with the Dean's request by changing the student's grade and
by signing a memorandum stating that he had changed the grad-
ing standard for the course.3 During the next two academic years,
the Dean and Michael Samuchin, the Head of the Department of
Civil Engineering, challenged Parate's grading standards in other
courses, criticized his teaching methods in conferences and in
front of students in class, removed Parate as the teacher of one
class, and issued low performance evaluations of Parate.4 In
1. Parate v Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 823 (6th Cir. 1989). Two students had requested that
their grades be changed from a "B" to an "A" in a "Groundwater and Seepage" course on
the grounds that extenuating circumstances had diminished their performances in the class.
Id. at 824. Parate granted one student's request because of the nature of the student's
excuse and because that student had performed better on the midterm examination than
on the final examination. Id. However, Parate refused the other student's request because
of the student's previously falsified excuses and because Parate had watched the student
cheat on the final examination. Id. After listening to Parate's explanations, both the Head of
the Civil Engineering Department and the Associate Dean of the School of Engineering
and Technology agreed with Parate's decision. Id. However, the student whose request
was denied was Nigerian and appealed to the Dean of the School of Engineering and
Technology, who was also Nigerian. Id. at 23-24. The Dean ordered Parate to change the
Nigerian student's grade and to sign a memorandum indicating that Parate was changing
his grading standard. Id. at 24.
2. Id. After Parate refused to change the student's grade and sign a memorandum
changing his grading standards, the Dean specifically told Parate that Parate did not know
how to teach, questioned Parate's academic credentials, and informed Parate that it was
probable that Parate's contract at Tennessee State University would not be renewed. Id.
3. Id. Initially, Parate attempted to comply with the Dean's request by noting on the
memorandum that he was changing his grading standard "as per instructions from Dean
and Department Head at meeting." Id. However, the Department Head returned to
Parate later in the day with a retyped copy of the memorandum noting the grade
alterations and warned Parate that the Dean would negatively affect Parate's evaluations
unless Parate signed the unaltered memorandum. Id. Consequently, Parate signed the
retyped memorandum, using a signature different from his usual one to signify that he was
being coerced into signing. Id. The Department Head returned with a third copy of the
memorandum, which Parate signed out of fear of repercussions from the Dean. Id. The
final memorandum indicated that Parate was adopting a new grading standard under
which a score of 86 qualified as an "A." Id. Under the old grading standard, a score of 86
was a "B." Id.
4. Id. In addition Parate was denied appropriate reimbursement for professional and
travel expenses, which stymied his research and professional advancements. Id. The
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March, 1985, Parate received a letter terminating his appointment
at the end of the 1985-86 academic year.5 In April, 1986, Parate
filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Dean, the Head of the Department, Tennessee State University,
and the Board of Regents of the State University and Community
College System of Tennessee.6 In the complaint, Parate alleged
violations of his right to academic freedom under the first amend-
ment.7 The district court dismissed Parate's 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims with prejudice and granted summary judgment for the
defendants.8 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
in part, affirmed in part, and held that Parate's first amendment
rights were violated when he was ordered to change the student's
grade.9 Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989).
President of Tennessee State University, acting on recommendations by the Dean and the
Department Head, chose not to renew Parate's teaching appointment. Id.
1 5. Id. at 824-825. In the termination letter, the President of Tennessee State
University indicated that Parate could request a statement of the reasons for his
nonrenewal from Michael Samuchin, the Head of the Department of Civil Engineering. Id.
at 825. Although Parate requested such a statement, Samuchin never responded. Id.
On September 16, 1985, Parate met with the Dean to reconcile their differences. Id.
In that meeting, the Dean informed Parate that the teaching contract might be renewed if
Parate's teaching performance improved, but that Parate would always have to obey the
Dean. Id. However, the situation worsened when later that year three more students, two
of them Nigerian, complained to the Dean about grades received from Parate in a "Statics"
course. Id. Within a few days of the students' complaints, the Dean and the Department
Head attended Parate's "'Statics" class and criticized his teaching methods in front of his
students. Id. The Dean then removed Parate from his post as teacher of the "Statics"
course, but insisted that Parate continue to attend the class as a student. Id. After five or six
class meetings, Parate was directed not to attend the class at all, and faculty observers
attended all of Parate's other classes. Id.
6. Id. An amended complaint, filed in June, 1986, named the President of Tennessee
State University, rather than Tennessee State University, and the Chancellor of the Board
of Regents, rather than the Board of Regents, as defendants in the suit. Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (providing a private cause of action for individuals who are
deprived of any constitutional right, privilege, or immunity, when that deprivation
occurred under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage).
7. Parate v. Isibor; 868 F.2d 821,.825 (6th Cir. 1989). Parate also alleged violations of
his liberty and due process interests under the fourteenth amendment. Id. In addition,
Parate alleged state law claims for defamation, interference with his right to work,
retaliatory discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Parate sought
preliminary and injunctive relief in addition to damages. Id. at 826.
8. Id. at 823. The district court dismissed with prejudice Parate's first and fourteenth
amendment claims stemming from the defendants' insistence that Parate alter grades in
the Groundwater and Seepage course and the defendants' interference with Parate's
teaching methods in the Statics course. Id. See Parate v. Isibor, No. 3-86-0311, slip op. at 9
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 1987). In addition, the district court dismissed the pendent state law
claims without prejudice. Parate, 868 F.2d at 823.
9. Id. at 830. However, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision that
Parate's first amendment rights were not violated in the "Statics" course incident involving
the Dean's open criticism of Parate's teaching methods. Id. at 831.
In addition, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Parate's
fourteenth amendment substantive due process claim. Id. at 833. Parate claimed that the
defendants had deprived him of his liberty interest by illegitimately interfering with his
teaching career at Tennessee State University. Id. at 831. However, the court of appeals
found that Parate had suffered no liberty interest violation because he was being barred
only from teaching at Tennessee State University, not at every other university. Id. at 832.
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Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to interfere with
the administration of state and local educational institutions.10
Courts have deemed that interference with educational adminis-
tration decisions is warranted only where constitutionally pro-
tected rights are implicated." Therefore, courts will not interfere
with employment decisions of educational administrators except
where constitutionally protected rights, such as those protected by
the first amendment, are at issue.1 2 In the educational forum, con-
stitutional rights are often implicated through issues of academic
freedom. 
13
In America, academic freedom is based on the same concept
of creating a "free marketplace of ideas" that underlies each
American citizen's right to free speech under the first amend-
ment. 4 In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,'5 the United States
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that a liberty interest is violated
if a stigma is attached to the individual's employment options).
In considering Parate's request for a preliminary injunction against his dismissal from
Tennessee State University, the court of appeals noted that because almost two years had
passed since Parate had been employed by Tennessee State University, Parate's request for
an injunction had become moot. Parate, 868 F.2d at 833.
10. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 & n.12 (1985) (federal
court is not the appropriate forum to make university decisions, because the court lacks
both the expertise and the immediate access to the problems involved to be able to make an
informed decision).
11. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (professor could not be
fired because he refused to sign a statement that he was not a communist, because such a
dismissal would be a violation of the professor's constitutionally protected free speech). See
also Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 135 (6th Cir. 1971) (university employment decisions are
an internal concern and may not be superseded by the courts unless a dismissal has
occurred because an instructor has exercised a constitutionally protected right such as free
speech), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
12. See Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 708 (6th Cir. 1973) (institution could decide
not to renew contract because instructor's teaching philosophy and manner were not
conducive to the institution's goals), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
13. See Smith, Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers in the
Public Schools, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353, 385 (1988) (first amendment protects teacher's
freedom to decide assignments and methods of teaching); U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances").
14. See Mertz, The Burden of Proof and Academic Freedom: Protection for Institution
or Individual?, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 492, 492-93 (1988). Just as the first amendment favors
free speech by the individual, academic freedom generally favors the speech of the
individual professor. Id. The ideological basis of academic freedom is from the German
policy of "lehrfreiheit" or teaching freedom, which allows teachers to choose the content of
their lectures and to publish their findings of research without fear of state or church
reproof. See Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom
in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (1988). The German concept of academic freedom
did not mean unlimited freedom for the professor; for instance, the professor was not
exempt from loyalty to the state.. Id. at 1270. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (teacher does not relinquish his individual free speech rights when addressing issues
of public concern). Pickering is the seminal case of teacher's first amendment rights in the
United States, which established that there is no general standard of academic freedom for
a teacher, but rather a series of factors which must be included in any evaluation of a
professor's academic freedom. Id. Several factors which are considered when determining
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Supreme Court held that academic freedom is necessary because
the first amendment encourages a variety of viewpoints in the
classroom rather than "a pall of orthodoxy."'1 6 The Court recog-
nized that a free flow of ideas between teachers and students, and
between students, cannot occur when teachers are forced to con-
fine discussions and curricula to formats established by decision-
makers outside the classroom.17 Thus, it is important that aca-
demic freedom extend to primary and secondary teachers, as well
as to college teachers, because it is an essential element of the free
flow of ideas that is necessary for effective education.'
Although it is essential that teachers have academic freedom
in their classrooms, academic freedom is not a privilege reserved
solely for the teacher.' 9 Instead, academic freedom consists of two
potentially conflicting freedoms: (1) the academic freedom for the
individual teacher to teach without institutional interference; and
(2) the academic freedom for the institution to govern without
governmental interference. 20 Both aspects of academic freedom
are needed to assure what have been called the "four essential
freedoms of the university" which are "who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study."12 1 Because of the potentially conflicting interests of admin-
if a teacher's speech is protected by the first amendment are whether the issue is of public
concern, whether the speech is obscene, or whether the topic will lead to employment
disharmony. See Ryan, Teacher Free Speech in the Public Schools: Just When You Thought
It Was Safe to Talk, 67 NEB. L. REV. 695, 698 (1988).
15. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
16. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (teacher could not be fired for
his refusal to sign a statement that he was not a communist because such coercion would
inhibit the free flow of ideas in the classroom).
17. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1405,
1409 (1988). Although academic freedom protects the free flow of ideas within the
classroom, academic freedom does not insulate the teacher from having to comply with
institutional norms. Id.
18. See Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66
TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (1988) (academic freedom has been embraced by the American
Association of University Professors as an essential element of American academia); Getman
& Mintz, Forward: Academic Freedom in a Changing Society, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1251
(1988) (academic freedom extends into the laboratory to provide researchers the needed
freedom to adequately research and report their findings).
19. Kohlburn, The Double-Edged Sword of Academic Freedom: Cutting the Scales of
Justice in Title VII Litigation, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 445, 449 (1987) (courts must always
recognize that academic freedom extends to the institution, as well as to the individual
teacher). But see Mertz, supra note 14, at 519 (generally, the individual professor, rather
than the institution, receives the benefit of protection by the first amendment).
20. Piarowski v. Illinois Community College Dist., 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985)
(institution had the right to restrict teacher's exhibition of art because the works were
racially offensive and sexually explicit), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985). See Kohlburn,
supra note 19, at 449.
21. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (first amendment protects
individual professors in their choice of what to teach, but it also protects the institution in
deciding who should teach, who should learn, and what the curriculum should be).
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istrators and teachers, compromise is needed to achieve a balance
between the individual teacher's right to choose course content
and teaching methods and the institution's right to supervise the
practices within the institution.2"
The balance of academic freedom rights does not always shift
in favor of the teacher.23 The important issue in striking a balance
of academic freedom is whether the controversy between the
teacher and the institution involves the infringement of one of the
teacher's constitutionally protected rights.24 Academic freedom
will not necessarily protect the teacher from supervision or dismis-
sal by administrators.25 However, when supervision interferes
with the teacher's legitimate exercise of free expression, or a dis-
missal arises from a teacher's exercise of a constitutionally pro-
tected right, such as free speech, then the balance shifts in favor of
the teacher.26 For example, a teacher has no cause of action for
being denied tenure if the institution's reason for the denial is
based on the nonconformity of the teacher's teaching methods to
the institution's standards.2 ' However, the teacher has a cause of
action against the institution if the institution's standards restrict
the free flow of ideas in the classroom, or the teacher's exercise of
22. Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (lst Cir. 1986) (first
amendment protection does not make a teacher sovereign or immune to an institution's
decisions regarding grading policies). See Smith, supra note 13 (instructor has freedom over
assignments and teaching methods, as long as they fall within professional boundaries and
institutional standards).
23. Mertz, supra note 14, at 519. The academic freedom adheres to the institution, or
to the individual, depending on who is defending the free flow of diverse ideas. Id.
24. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1977)
(teacher's conduct of fighting with other teachers and making obscene gestures to students
was not free expression protected by the constitution). See generally Mertz, supra note 14
(dealing with the necessary burden of proof in showing violation of an instructor's academic
freedom).
25. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283 (1977)
(because teacher's conduct of fighting with other teachers and making obscene gestures to
students were not free expression protected by the constitution, they were legitimate
grounds for dismissal); Vasquez v. City of Hamtramck, 757 F.2d 771, 773 (6th Cir. 1985) (no
constitutionally valid claim exists for every small harassment by a state).
26. Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1971) (institution can dismiss a
nontenured teacher for any reason, except for the teacher's exercise of a constitutionally
protected right), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972). See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (teacher must establish that exercise of a
constitutionally protected right was motivating factor behind dismissal).
27. Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 708-09 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943
(1973). In Hetrick, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an institution could
deny tenure to a teacher, thereby punishing the teacher, because the teacher's instructional
methods were not adaptable to that institution's academic goals. Id.
See, e.g., Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts University, 793 F.2d 419, 425 (1st Cir.
1986). Although the teacher's refusal to lower his grading standards may have been the
cause of dismissal, the institution was within its rights to dismiss the teacher for failure to
conform to institutional standards, because the teacher's grading policy is not protected by
the constitution. Id.
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free expression.28
To qualify for constitutional protection, the teacher's expres-
sion must be expressive or communicative.2" In order to be
expressive or communicative, the expression must be a statement
or conduct which is both clearly intended and widely understood
to convey a message to other people.3 0 Conduct which is expres-
sive or communicative in nonacademic settings has been recog-
nized consistently as symbolic communication protected by the
first amendment.3' For example, in Texas v. Johnson,32 the
Supreme Court held that the burning of an American flag during a
demonstration which coincided with the Republican National
Convention clearly was intended as communication, and was
widely understood as communication, and, therefore, was deserv-
ing of first amendment protection.3 3
Similarly, the Court has recognized and protected symbolic
communication in the academic forum as well as in the public
forum.3 4 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
28. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254 (1957) (an instructor cannot be
barred from employment on the basis of membership in an organization); Megill v. Bd. of
Regents of the State of Fla., 541 F.2d 1073, 1080-81 (5th Cir. 1976) (nonrenewal may not be
based on individual's exercise of first amendment rights); Epperson V. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 109 (1968) (Court invalidated a state law that would endanger a teacher's position for
teaching Darwinism, which the Court found to be a valid exercise of the constitutionally
protected right of free expression).
29. Fowler v. Bd. of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 664 (6th Cir. 1987) (teacher's showing of the
film "Pink Floyd-The Wall" was not protected because it was neither expressive nor
communicative), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 906 (1987).
30. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-411 (1974) (display of an American flag,
upside down, with a peace symbol taped on it was recognized as an expressive activity
protected by the first amendment). In addition to being expressive or communicative, the
expression must conform to guidelines for protected academic speech, such as being a
subject of public concern, and not being obscene or fighting words. See The Fraser
Balancing Test: Leaving Cohen's Jacket at the Schoolhouse Gate, 52 Mo. L. REV. 913, 915
(1987) (the current Fraser balancing test requires that indecent language employed on
school premises must be balanced by the state's interest of an objective beyond maintaining
control over the school personnel and students).
See generally Ryan, supra note 14, at 712-16 (teacher's speech must be of public
concern in order for it to be guaranteed to be constitutionally protected; otherwise there
are no guarantees that the speech falls within the protected range).
31. Friedman, Why Do You Speak That Way? Symbolic Expression Reconsidered, 15
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 588-89 (1988) (five major motivations for using expressive
conduct for communication rather than spoken communication are that expressive conduct
better encapsulates an idea; it is more socially acceptable; it attracts media attention; it
creates a greater feeling of self-fulfillment; and it facilitates other forms of speech).
32. 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989).
33. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2547-49 (1989). See also Monroe v. State Court of
Fulton County, 739 F.2d 568, 572 (11 th Cir. 1984) (if the burning of a flag as part of a larger
demonstration was likely to convey a message, then the action could be viewed as symbolic
communication protected by the first amendment).
34. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (students' wearing of black armbands was found to be expressive conduct protected
by the first amendment).
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District,35 the Court held that students' wearing of black arm-
bands to protest the Vietnam War was expressive conduct entitled
to first amendment protection because the protest occurred dur-
ing a period of demonstrations against the War and because the
message conveyed by the students' black arm bands was clearly
intended and widely understood as communication.36 Similarly, in
Brown v. Louisiana, the Court held that black students' staging
of a protest sit-in in a segregated library was symbolic speech pro-
tected by the first amendment, because the action occurred at a
time and place that made the conduct clearly intended to be and
widely understood as conveying a message.38 The Supreme Court
has held that if an action in an academic forum conveys a message
that is intended to be a communication and is widely understood
to be a communication by those who observe it, then that action is
symbolic expression protected by the first amendment.39
In addition to protecting the freedom to verbally or symboli-
cally express one's own ideas, the first amendment guarantees that
a person may not be forced to communicate someone else's ideas
through compelled speech.40  For example, in Wooley v. May-
nard,4 ' the Supreme Court held that the State of New Hampshire
could not compel its residents to participate in the dissemination
of an ideological message by forcing them to display state license
plates which carried the motto "Live Free or Die. "42
Courts also have considered the question of first amendment
protection against compelled speech in the academic forum.43
Courts have found that if an administrator has censored or com-
35. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
37. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
38. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
39. See Fowler v. Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 662 (6th Cir. 1987) (teacher's showing
of a film was not protected because the teacher could not have intended it to be expressive
or communicative conduct, since the teacher had not previously viewed the film), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 502 (1987).
40. See Smith, supra note 13, at 362 (teacher can say what he believes as long as he
does not force the students into accepting those beliefs); Riley v. National Fed'n. of the
Blind of North Carolina, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2669-70 (1988) (compelling a speaker to reveal
specific information alters that person's speech and violates the speaker's constitutional
right of free expression).
41. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
42. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (display of the message on the license
plates was compelling residents to participate in disseminating an idea that they may find
abhorent).
43. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (teacher could not be
dismissed for refusing to sign that he was not a communist, because the first, amendment
protects against compelling a person to make a statement about his beliefs and encourages a
marketplace of ideas); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teachers do not
relinquish their individual constitutional rights, such as free expression, when they become
teachers); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (Court invalidated a state law that
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pelled alteration of a teacher's course content or method of teach-
ing, then the teacher's constitutionally protected right to free
expression may have been violated.44
In Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State University,45 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether a teacher had
been dismissed due to his refusal to comply with an administrator's
directive to alter a student's grade.46 The Hillis court noted that
the administrator had solved the conflict between the institution
and the teacher by altering the student's grade himself, without
compelling the teacher to change the grade.47 In addition, the
Hillis court found that the assignment of the grade to the student
was not a teaching method protected by academic freedom.4 8
Therefore, the Hillis court held that the administrative alteration
of the letter grade assigned by the teacher was not a violation of
the teacher's free expression protected by the first amendment.49
However, in Parate v. Isibor,50 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found that a teacher's right of free expression had
been violated when he was compelled to alter a student's letter
grade.5 ' Parate claimed that his academic freedom, protected by
the first amendment, was violated when the Dean coerced him
into changing a student's grade from a "B" to an "A." '5 2 The court
of appeals held that by ordering Parate to change the student's
grade, rather than by administratively changing the grade them-
selves, the Dean and the Head of the Department unconstitution-
ally compelled Parate's speech to his student.5 3
The court of appeals arrived at its conclusion by first review-
ing the district court's dismissal of Parate's first amendment
would endanger a teacher's position for teaching Darwinism which the Court found to be a
valid exercise of the constitutionally protected right of free expression).
44. See Smith, supra note 13, at 398 (teacher has freedom over assignments and
teaching methods, as long as they fall within professional boundaries and institutional
standards).
45. 665 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 1982).
47. Id. at 553. In Hillis, the teacher had been ordered by an administrator to enroll a
student and give her a grade of "B," rather than the "grade withheld" ranking which the
teacher had assigned to the student. Id. After the teacher refused to alter the grade, the
administrator changed the grade on the records himself. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (altering a grade administratively was within the institution's perogative).
50. 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989).
51. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989). Contra Hillis v. Stephen F.
Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1982Xteacher's assignment of a letter grade
was not a "teaching method" protected by academic freedom), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982).
52. Parate, 868 F.2d. at 829. For a discussion of Parate's additional claims, see supra
notes 7-8.
53. Parate, 868 F.2d at 830.
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claim.5 4 The court of appeals found that the district court had mis-
construed Parate's first amendment claim as being a request for a
guarantee that the student would receive the "B" grade which
Parate had assigned originally.5" Relying on precedent, the dis-
trict court had found that Parate did not have a constitutionally
protected interest in the grade that the student ultimately
received.56 Therefore, the district court was able to conclude that
a professor's being compelled to change a grade did not qualify as
a constitutional violation of the professor's rights, because the pro-
fessor had no constitutionally protected right in the grade itself.
57
Although the court of appeals agreed that Parate did not have
a constitutional interest in the final grade that the student actually
received, the court held that Parate's first amendment rights were
violated when he was compelled to change the grade because he
was compelled to make a specific communication to the student.58
The court of appeals noted that the district court's dismissal of
Parate's first amendment claims was based on the decision in Hillis
v. Stephen F. Austin State University that the assignment of grades
does not constitute a teaching method protected by academic
freedom.5 9 However, the court of appeals distinguished Hillis on
its facts, noting that the teacher in that case was not compelled to
personally change a student's grade and, therefore, was not com-
pelled to change his own communication to the student.60 Rather,
the court of appeals noted that in Hillis the teacher's constitu-
tional rights were not violated because the student's grade was
changed by the administrators. 61 The court of appeals stated that
54. Id. at 829. See Parate v. Isibor, No. 3-86- 0311, slip op. (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 1987).
55. Id. at 827 (the district court had miscontrued Parate as claiming a constitutionally
protected interest in the grade that the student actually received, rather than as claiming to
be compelled against his professional judgment to assign a higher grade to the student).
56. Id. at 829-30 (citing Hillis v. Stephen F Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.
1982) (grades were not a teaching method protected by academic freedom), cert. denied
457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
57. Parate, 868 F.2d. at 829.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 828. See Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.
1982) (administrative alteration of a grade was within the institution's prerogative), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
60. Id. at 829 (citing Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)).
61. Id. at 829 (citing Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)). In Parate, the court of appeals distinguished
Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 425 (1st. Cir. 1986), because that case
dealt with a teacher's noncompliance with the grading criteria of the institution, rather
than with administrative coercion to change a specific grade in order to benefit a student.
Id. at 829. In addition, the court of appeals distinguished Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705,
708-09 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973), because Hetrick dealt with a
dismissal due to a teacher's noncompliance with the institution's teaching standards. Id. at
830.
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if the administrators had changed the student's grade themselves,
rather than compelling Parate to change it, no violation of Parate's
rights would have occurred.6 2
However, the court of appeals found that because the admin-
istrators compelled Parate to alter the grade, rather than adminis-
tratively altering the grade themselves to settle the dispute, the
administrators chose an unduly burdensome and constitutionally
infirm remedy to solve the problem, thereby violating Parate's
constitutional rights protected by the first amendment. 63 The
court of appeals concluded that a professor has no constitutional
interest in the final grade that the student ultimately receives;
thus, the administration has the authority to alter a student's
grade, as long as the administration does not coerce the professor
into performing the alteration.64
The court of appeals next examined Parate's second claim that
the defendants had violated Parate's academic freedom by pub-
licly criticising his teaching on one occasion and by removing him
as teacher of the "Statics" course.65 The court of appeals noted
that although an individual teacher's academic freedom protects
him from arbitrary interference, university administrators do have
the right to evaluate and instruct teachers.66 In addition, the court
of appeals recognized that courts can not intervene in administra-
tive decisions, unless basic constitutional rights are at issue.67 The
court of appeals noted that although the Dean's behavior was
unprofessional, it did not rise to the level of a constitutional viola-
tion.68 The court. of appeals held that the Dean's behavior did not
violate Parate's first, amendment right to academic freedom
because Parate was not denied an open and free exchange with his
62. Parate, 868 F.2d at 830. See Hillis v. StephenF. Austin State Univ;, 665 F.2d 547,
553 (5th Cir. 1982) (the administrator changed the grade in question, thereby avoiding a
violation of the professor's rights), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
63. Parate, 868 F.2d at 830.
64. Id.
65. Id. A few days after two Nigerian students had complained to Parate about the
grades that he had given them in the "Statics" course, the Dean entered Parate's classroom
unannounced and interrupted Parate's teaching by shouting criticisms from the back of the
room. Id. at 824.
66. Id. See Megill v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding
that states may grant power to university administrators with unfettered discretion, and
that the Board of Regents could dismiss the teacher for any reason that did not violate his
constitutional rights).
67. Parate, 868 F.2d at 830. See Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 708 (6th Cir. 1973) (to
justify court intervention in an administrative matter, the administration's actions would
have to be very restrictive, "shock the conscience," or affect the professor's constitutional
rights), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
68. Parate, 868 F.2d at 830. The court of appeals agreed with the district court's
finding that the Dean's actions of criticizing Parate did not exceed the level of a tort of
defamation. Id. at 831.
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students at any time, which. is the basic goal behind the first
amendment protection of academic freedom.69 Furthermore, the
court of appeals held that the Dean's criticism, as an isolated inci-
dent, could not have significantly interfered with the free flow of
ideas.70 Therefore, the court of appeals held that Parate, as a
teacher subject to supervision, had no first amendment right to be
free from the criticism of his administrators.7 1
Analogizing from the court of appeal's holding that a teacher's
assignment of a grade is protected communication, first amend-
ment protection can be extended to other types of communication
that require professional evaluations of other people.72 These
evaluations might include educational evaluations of former or
current students, recommendations for graduate study programs
or for post-graduation employment, or formal discussions of other
faculty members for purposes of distributing scholarships, awards,
or tenure.73 The Parate v. Isibor decision would imply. that a pro-
fessor could not be coerced into altering his professional evalua-
tions, although an administrator could alter the evaluations under
his own administrative authority. 4
The same first amendment analysis that was used in Parate
could be used for other professions that are protected directly by
the first amendment, such as the communications media.75 For
example, the decision would imply that a reporter could not be
compelled by an editor or publisher to alter his communication to
the public.76 Conversely, the editor or publisher could alter the
communication himself, although not under the guise of the
reporter.7 7
69. Id. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (one of the
justifications of academic freedom is to make the classroom into a marketplace of ideas).
70. Parate, 868 F.2d at 831. At the end of this incident, the only one where the Dean
openly criticized Parate in front of students during class time, the Dean removed Parate as
the teacher of the course. Id. at 825.
71. Id. at 831. Although Parate claimed that the administrators' supervision and
criticism was illegitimate because his contract for the following year had already been
terminated, the court of appeals found that Parate had no right to be free from supervisory
authority. Id.
72. See Univ. 6f Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 110 S.Ct. 577, 585 (1990) (arguments made for
academia could be applied to other fora that further speech and learning).
73. Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 110 S.Ct. 577, 586 (1990) (academic discussions involving
tenure need to be frank in order to be effective). See Kohlburn, supra note 19, at 464
(important decisions, such as tenure recommendations, require protection of academic
freedom to preserve frankness about colleagues).
74. See generally Kohlburn,. supra note 19, at 464 (identifying various types of
communication in the academic forum that should be protected by the first amendment).
75. See generally Friedman, supra note 31, at 588-91 (regarding constitutional
protection of symbolic expression in nonacademic fora).
76. Id. at 597-98.
77. Id. at 593 (the extent of first amendment protection of various types of symbolic
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Although Parate v. Isibor is a Sixth Circuit case, and thus not
controlling law in North Dakota, this decision could be used in
North Dakota to establish a similar precedent.78 For example,
Parate could be used to support a teacher's academic freedom in
situations regarding speech or conduct compelled by an adminis-
trator against the teacher's beliefs.7 9
Rosanna Malouf Peterson
communication should depend on why the individual has chosen that medium for
expression).
78. See generally Smith, supra note 13 at 355 (examining the broad range of topics
covered by a teacher's academic freedom, many of which are timely issues ripe for
adjudication).
79. See Mertz, supra note 14, at 498 (the heaviest burden of proof generally is carried
by the institution when the rights of a teacher and an institution conflict).
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